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John Moeller* 
The idea of my purifying politics is absurd. . . . I do not cling very closely to life. 
and do not value my own very highly, but I will not tangle it in such a way: I will 
not share the profits of vice; I am not willing to be made a receiver of stolen 
goods, or to be put in a position where I am perpetually obliged to maintain that 
immorality is a virtue. I 
That attitude, Henry Fairlie opines, reflects not so much what 
politicians say and do, but rather a credibility gap caused by a 
"general lack of understanding of what politics can and should 
attempt to do."z The gap is not limited to the uneducated or those 
who have little time for politics, but even extends to a majority of 
the justices on the current Supreme Court. Writing for a six-man 
majority recently in Branti v. Finke/,3 Justice Stevens argued that 
the first amendment prohibits firing a county assistant public de-
fender because of his political party affiliation. Reasonable per-
sons can disagree with Justice Powell's dissent that there are 
"substantial governmental interests served by reasonable pa-
tronage,"4 but Stevens does not even consider whether politics 
should play a role in such appointments, despite the long history 
of patronage in the United States. 
The ease with which the courts dismiss the importance of 
politics reflects the curious irony that the only people who still 
believe the myth that courts are nonpolitical seem to be the judges 
themselves. Because of its important implications for the Ameri-
can political system, however, this is more than an amusing irony. 
It encourages a guardian ethics whereby judges impose change on 
the political system on behalf of some higher principle. It also 
enables the courts to advocate pure, majoritarian democracy at 
the expense of reflective, political democracy. Both facets emerge 
• Assistant Professor. Luther College. 
I. H. ADAMS, DEMOCRACY 238 (1952). 
2. Fairlie, The Politician's Art, HARPERS, Dec. 1977, at 33. 
3. 445 U.S. 507 (1980) 
4. /d. at 532 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
5. Cj. W. ELLIOT, THE RISE OF GUARDIAN DEMOCRACY (1974). 
203 
204 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY (Vol. 1:203 
in cases involving reapportionment, patronage, and conflicts be-
tween national political parties and state election laws. 
Reapportionment, in particular, has been described, ana-
lyzed, and debated at great length; yet few commentators pay seri-
ous attention to how those decisions affect the activity of politics. 
In part, I believe, that is because so many students of constitu-
tional law see the Court as the isolated center of the political uni-
verse rather than one voice within the larger political colloquy. 
My intent here is to propose a view of the Court that includes 
participation in the political process. I will begin by discussing 
"what politics can and should attempt to do," and will illustrate 
how the courts have succumbed to the credibility gap Fairlie 
describes. 
I. BICKEL'S VISION OF POLITICS 
Alexander Bickel's defense of politics emanated from a life-
long fascination with law and the courts.6 Implicit in his writings 
are four propositions: ( 1) politics accommodates competing inter-
ests; (2) politics is empirical; (3) politics is inspired by an underly-
ing moral foundation; and (4) politics is an ongoing conversation. 
Although it may seem like a detour, understanding Bickel is a pre-
requisite for understanding the proper role of the courts. 
"The business of politics is not with theory and ideology but 
with accommodation."? This has been true in the United States at 
least since Madison persuaded his fellow participants at the Con-
stitutional Convention that a large republic would be preferable to 
a small one. Besides the "various and unequal distribution of 
property,''s individuals differ in their wants and needs, in their 
fortunes, and in their opinions about religion and government. 
These differences lead people to form groups-Madison calls 
them factions-that seek their own gain at the expense of others. 
Whether or not increasing the size of the republic solves the prob-
lem, it does increase the number of groups and competing inter-
ests, as well as the need for some kind of accommodation. 
Furthermore, no group or interest can legitimately claim an 
absolute right to any position. Not only are absolute claims 
fraught with dangerous consequences~onsider the French 
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1984] FAIR POLITICS 205 
Revolution-but absolute rights do not exist. Rights are real only 
when and because society grants them. Thus, one can argue per-
suasively that society should grant the right to vote or the right to 
decent health care, but they become rights only when the society's 
accommodation affirms them as rights. 
The formation of electoral districts illustrates Bickel's propo-
sition. We district geographically in the United States because no 
theory of representation is universally valid. Interests are impor-
tant and like-minded groups should be allowed to speak as a uni-
fied voice. At the same time, we do not dare let those interests 
govern completely, in part for the reasons Madison explained. 
The compromise recognizes the difference in theories of represen-
tation, and it also recognizes the presence of divers interests. Hav-
ing determined to use geographic districts, our need to 
accommodate intensifies. Which interests shall be represented? 
Do we break up a sect of Hassidic Jews to guarantee better group 
representation for black voters?9 Do we favor Democrats in some 
districts and Republicans in others? And which theory of repre-
sentation do we then embrace? One that guarantees absolute 
equality of votes as measured by population? One that propor-
tions votes by ethnicity? By geography? By occupation? Whatever 
the answer, it will be found not by appealing to heaven, but rather 
will depend on someone, somehow accommodating divers 
interests. 
For politics truly to be an accommodation, it must begin with 
the facts of our existence, which is to say politics is empirical. Ab-
stractions are nice, but politics must deal empirically with "human 
nature as it is seen to be."w Martin Diamond's response to specu-
lation that a president could win the electoral votes while losing 
the popular votes is to the point: his grandfather, Diamond 
mused, often said of his grandmother that "if [she) had wheels 
she'd be a trolly car."tt The game of "what if' can be played 
endlessly, but politics deals with "what is." As Bickel writes about 
reapportionment: 
What does it mean to juggle ratios or to bewail the fact that 20 per cent of a state's 
population can elect a majority of its legislature, X per cent of the population of 
the United States can elect the President, and X-10 per cent can elect the Senate? 
These are not facts; such things never happen.12 
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To paraphrase Henry Fairlie, the politician is like a potter 
who does not get to choose his clay, the painter who is not allowed 
to mix his own paints, the conductor who must direct a brass band 
with music scored for a string quartet. That is, politicians may 
wish for more money to enact new programs, bewail that not 
everyone is altruistic and caring, hope beyond hope that alliances 
will remain firm, and search for a certain path from here to there. 
But resources are finite, many people are solipsists, majorities con-
stantly change, and unexpected happenstances do interfere with 
carefully chosen plans. Machiavelli may have been wrong about 
much, but his insights about the role of Fortune remain authentic 
today. Politics must accommodate that which is given, not that 
which is wished. 
That is why Bickel could be a Bobby Kennedy liberal in the 
1960'sl3 and wonder publicly in the 1970's whether wide-scale in-
tegration should be reevaluated.I4 In real life the results in the 
South might not be replicable in the North. And who can be cer-
tain as to the effects integration has had on education? When a 
certain black-white ratio is reached in the schools, Bickel con-
tended, white flight becomes an empirical reality. And when fed-
eral involvement increases, both black and white families begin to 
clamor for decentralized, local control of schools. The reality is 
that "[m]assive school integration is not going to be attained in 
this country very soon, in good part because no one is certain that 
it is worth the cost."I5 That is not an easy thing for many to ac-
cept, and yet the prudent politician has to work with the condi-
tions and materials available. 
Politics that is only accommodation and empirical seeks only 
to satisfy the selfish interests of competing groups by doling out 
morsels to each. But politics properly understood engages the citi-
zenry in the quest for the good state, which in tum contributes to 
the personal quest for the good life. Thus, politics must be princi-
pled. At a minimum that includes the moral duty to obey the law, 
which is the fabric that holds society together. It includes as-
senting to the moral authority of rational, civil discourse, with an 
accommodation that reflects persuasive argument rather than 
brute force. And it may even include an acceptable tone--call it a 
quality of life-that is shared by the entire community. 
In addition to those basic procedural principles, some sub-
stantive values are worthy of being treated as "a rule of action that 
13. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 71 (1980). 
14. Bickel, Where Do We Go From Here?, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 7, 1970. 
15. /d. 
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will be authoritatively enforced without adjustment or concession 
and without let-up."t6 They are the first principles upon which all 
else builds, the enduring values of the nation. They are the values 
that people fight-and die-to preserve.n For Americans, these 
values include adherence to liberty and equality as stated in the 
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. And they 
must be present if politics is to be a worthy activity. 
Does this praise for a politics that simultaneously is princi-
pled and empirical expose a contradiction? No, we merely have 
come to grips with what Bickel called the "Lincolnian [t]ension" 
between principle and expediency.ts This tension characterized 
Lincoln's attempt to inculcate the Declaration of Independence's 
principled commitment to equality on existing institutions. Lin-
coln knew the value of principle, but he also knew the necessity of 
expedient compromise: "a radically principled solution would col-
lide with widespread prejudices, which no government resting on 
consent could disregard, any more than it could sacrifice its goals 
to them."t9 Most important, he knew that accommodation of en-
during values with empirical realities is the heart of enduring 
government. 
The accommodation of interests and principles emerges from 
an ongoing conversation. Accommodations never are final or 
complete. They may receive all of the attention and study, but it 
is the accommodating-the ongoing conversation-that does all 
of the work. Lyndon Johnson received much praise in 1964 when 
he signed the Civil Rights Act. The struggle for that Act began at 
least as early as Hubert Humphrey's participation in the 1948 
Democratic National Convention and led through numerous fili-
busters in the Senate, Rules Committee delays in the House, liti-
gation before the Supreme Court, protests by the citizenry-both 
violent and peaceful, by both blacks and whites, in favor and 
against-and endless other activities. Even then the final law was 
not the "right law" preordained years earlier, but rather a good 
law that reflected the tensions of many sides, the reciprocal rela-
tions of Democrats and Republicans, Northerners and 
Southerners, the impositions of federal courts, and generally the 
activity of politics in all of its glory and all of its despair. As im-
16. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE 
BAR OF POLITICS 59 ( 1962). 
17. They are the values found in the public opinion of the nation. Cf Nisbet, Public 
Opinion versus Popular Opinion, 41 Pus. INTEREST 166 (1975). 
18. A. BICKEL, supra note 16, at 65. 
!9. /d. at 68. 
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portant as that 1964 Civil Rights Act was-and is-it was but one 
frame in the cinema of politics. 
And thus, the emphasis on particular policies and specific 
elections is misplaced. Policies change and elections are occa-
sional, whereas politics is continuous: 
[T]he bulk of the political process is below .... The jockeying. the bargaining. 
the trading, the threatening and the promising, the checking and the balancing. 
the spurring and the vetoing are continuous.20 
Out of this conversation come the accommodations. And not one 
of those accommodations is final, because empirical conditions 
are in constant flux, self-evident principles are never evident to all 
in the same way, and the diversity of needs and wants is inherent 
to man's nature. This process of accommodating supercedes any 
substantive policy position and "seems ... to make everything 
else possible."21 Specifically, it makes possible stability, freedom, 
and the consent of the governed. 
Most of us feel more comfortable in familiar surroundings. 
We are more willing to accept that which is new if it has evolved 
naturally instead of being foisted upon us. The same is true for 
society: it rarely can "digest radical structural change" and rever-
berates in ways no one can predict when faced with the "sudden 
abandonment of institutions" that have governed and held it to-
gether.22 The revolutionary's pursuit of absolute truth makes 
ramshackles of society or tyrannizes it, destroying consent or au-
thority and leaving only raw power. 
This is not to suggest that politics is good only because it is 
the absence of tyranny and chaos. Politics is a positive good be-
cause it inculcates freedom by encouraging diversity in a society. 
Group participation is the reason for diversity, and in politics "the 
cry is for group participation .... "23 One can join a group and 
do battle in the political arena, "exerting every ounce of power 
and influence we can command,"24 hoping to win the day. The 
group may be right or wrong, it may win or lose, but the rules are 
the same for all and the contest is open to all. Participation is 
"equally available or foreclosed to all"2s-and that is what en-
ables our government to be both open and free. 
20. A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 83 (1978). 
21. A. BICKEL, supra note 7, at 30. 
22. A. BICKEL, THE NEW AGE OF POLITICAL REFORM: THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE, 
THE CONVENTION, AND THE PARTY SYSTEM 3 (1968). 
23. A. BICKEL, supra note 20, at 116. 
24. Bickel, supra note 12, at 491. 
25. Bickel, The Revolution of Unreason. NEw REPUBLIC. Oct. 17. 1970. at 18. 21. 
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Most important, where there is politics there is consent, and 
where there is consent there is democracy. Democracy exists 
when the people have "access to, participation in, influence on the 
process of decision, and only ultimately and in necessarily attenu-
ated fashion . . . ensuring at election time the legislature's fidelity 
to the popular wi11."26 Elections, consequently, are only a "sort of 
symbol of political democracy."21 Real democracy exists where 
there is popular responsiveness, so that government represents the 
numerical majority and reflects the diversity of the people. 
Most political conflicts are pragmatic disputes in which each 
contestant believes he alone is being rational. In reality, politics 
involves opinion rather than certifiable truth, and reflects conflict-
ing demands for power and goods in society. The final resolution, 
therefore, is never right in any absolute sense, but merely reflects 
the deliberate choice of society. Regardless of the specific sub-
stantive choice made, if the people have given their consent by 
sharing in the process, and if the choice has evolved from an open 
dialogue and has accommodated the diversity of interests in the 
society, then we have a well-working democracy. 
II. THE JUDICIAL INTRUSION INTO POLITICS 
When the courts overturn a political decision, they unwit-
tingly challenge the political process. If we think of the courts as 
just another political actor, and if the court has avoided the final-
ity of a constitutional interpretation, there is scant reason to be 
disturbed. The stakes increase, however, when a court uses judi-
cial review to strike down a political decision, for that puts a 
damper on the colloquy. But the most troublesome judicial deci-
sions are those that change the fundamental structure of the polit-
ical system. During the past fifteen years the courts increasingly 
have chipped away at the form of politics that evolved within the 
American tradition. They have attempted to replace it with a 
competing model that only resembles politics. 
There is nothing malicious about the justices' intentions. 
Their goal is the noble one of achieving "fair and effective repre-
sentation for all citizens."2s Chief Justice Warren, who always 
professed the concern that his decisions be fair, and Justice Bren-
nan, who has been in the forefront of the movement to open up 
the poiitical process, were fully familiar with the "real world of 
politics" before ascending to the Supreme Court. Perhaps a life-
26. Bickel, supra note 12, at 488. 
27. Bickel, The Supreme Court and Political Democracy, 44 F.R.D. 158, 160 (1968). 
28. 377 U.S. 533, 565-66 (1964). -
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time of observing examples of politics leads to a desire to make it 
fairer. 
No, the proponents of fairer politics are not part of an evil 
conspiracy. The problem is their refusal-or inability-to under-
stand that because fairness is a relative concept, it cannot be real-
ized in a pure form. Sometimes fairness calls for absolute 
equality; at other times it would be grossly unfair to treat everyone 
equally. But more than that, fairness ultimately is a product of 
the conversation that accommodates empirical reality and under-
lying principles. It is not a quantifiable value that can be imposed 
impartially. 
A. REAPPORTIONMENT 
The search for fairness blossomed in the reapportionment 
cases, beginning with Baker v. Carr.29 Indeed, when one consid-
ers this line of cases, it is plain that although equality is the means, 
fairness is the end. And it also is clear this pursuit of fairness has 
led the Court into a quagmire.Jo What began as a quest for the 
equal weighting of votes by population, then evolved to evaluat-
ing the quality of access to the political system, and finally ma-
tured into a call for equal success in the political system. 
In Baker v. Carr the Court " 'discovered the Fundamental 
Principle of equal representation for equal numbers.' "31 This 
principle posits the vote as the cardinal concept of representative 
democracy. This model of democracy is mechanical and stresses 
"universalism, individualism, equality, and abstract conceptual 
symmetry";32 it is contractarian and regards individuals as the pri-
mary unit, with equal opportunity to participate as the fundamen-
tal right; it is majoritarian and believes that political decisions 
must reflect as closely as possible the will of the majority. As a 
result, it is as wrong to dilute one's vote as to deny it outright, 
whether at the lowest levels of government or the highest.33 To be 
sure, absolute equality might be unattainable, but that problem 
can be resolved by establishing a de minimis deviation,34 while 
recognizing that extraordinary cases may require exceptions to be 
made. 
The second stage of reapportionment grew out of the Court's 
29. 369 u.s. 186 (1962). 
30. Cf. W. ELLIOT, supra note 5, ch. 5. 
31. /d. at 132. 
32. /d. at 196. 
33. See Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968). 
34. Cf. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 
526 (1969). 
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recognition that perhaps it was digging itself into a hole. Specifi-
cally, it confronted the paradox that the logical way to maximize 
equality is the multimember district. As every introductory civics 
book explains, such districts lessen the likelihood for successful 
participation by minority groups. If there is racial, ethnic, or 
party bloc-voting, the minority Blacks, Mexican-Americans, or 
Republicans never have much chance at the voting booth. Per-
haps, a lower court judge proposes, there can be more than one 
meaning to fair: 
A case alleging violation of the one person, one vote standard, based solely 
on mathematical analysis, may properly be called a "quantitative" reapponion-
ment case. That an apponionment scheme satisfies the quantitative standard 
does not, however, insure equality in all the aspects of political representation. 
The heterogeneity of our society manifests itself in an unequal distribution of 
interest groups; racial and ethnic groups tend to be companmentalized .... 
Cases alleging a distonion of group voting power ... have been termed "qualita-
tive" reapponionment cases because they focus "not on population-based appor-
tionment but on the quality of representation."35 
Using that distinction, lower courts began to exceed the one-man, 
one-vote standard by also demanding that the votes cast be equal 
in strength. Although the Court found no constitutional violation 
in Whitcomb v. Chavis ,36 it did hint at a willingness to treat seri-
ously a case where voter dilution correlated with invidious dis-
crimination. Justice Harlan presciently observed that standards 
based on debasement, dilution, and voting power were replacing 
mere majoritarianism. Two years later the Supreme Court did or-
der reapportionment of multimember districts where the history 
of discrimination, the lack of minority success at the polls, and 
various ingredients in the electoral process indicated that access 
had been denied.37 
The third stage may have been snuffed out by the Supreme 
Court in Mobtle v. Bolden 3s before it had a chance to develop 
fully. It began in a 1973 test devised by the Fifth Circuit for eval-
uating the invidious effect of unfair representation.39 According to 
that test, the court would evaluate: ( 1) factors that indicated mi-
nority access to the political process (filing fees, party slating, 
number of elected officials); (2) whether elected officials are re-
sponsive to the interests of the community (minority appointments 
to boards, services provided minority neighborhoods); (3) whether 
35. Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 215-16 (5th Cir. 1978). 
36. 403 U.S. 124 (1971). 
37. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973). 
38. 446 U.S. 55 ( 1980). 
39. Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973). 
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state policy affects the inability of minorities to be elected; and 
(4) whether the effects of historical discrimination remain alive. 
The approach reached its pinnacle when the Fifth Circuit deter-
mined the commission government of Mobile, Alabama to be un-
fair and ordered it replaced with a fairer form of government. 
The Supreme Court overturned that decision and rejected the 
Fifth Circuit's test in an opinion I will examine more closely 
below. 
What stage four will entail is uncertain, but the Court's in-
volvement probably has not ended. First, the gerrymander ques-
tion remains unresolved. Although there is no reason that the 
courts must settle it, some extremely political gerrymandering 
during the most recent round of reapportionment already has led 
to at least one suit in the California federal courts. The Court 
may be willing to hear such a case. In the New Jersey redistricting 
decision last Term,4o Justice Stevens wrote a lengthy concurring 
opinion in which he proposed a well-developed case for regarding 
political gerrymandering as one species of vote dilution. In dis-
sent, Justice Powell also stated his willingness "to entertain consti-
tutional challenges to partisan gerrymandering." Second, the third 
decennial reapportionment since Baker v. Carr resulted in a host 
of disputes, some of which have made their way to the Supreme 
Court. The New Jersey case even seemed like old times. Justice 
Brennan opined for the majority that a .7% deviation between the 
largest and smallest district failed to satisfy the requirements of 
article I, section 2 because a truly good faith effort could have 
reduced the deviation even further. Justice White vigorously ar-
gued for the four-person minority that at some point there must be 
a satisfactory 'de minimus' deviation. Third, Mobile v. Bolden 
may be less significant than it first seemed. In Rogers v. Lodge.41 
the Court announced that those factors deemed insignificant in 
Mobile really are significant. Furthermore, the extension of the 
Voting Rights Act, including an "effect" standard, may shift the 
litigation from the constitutional question to a statutory one, forc-
ing the courts to remain in a quagmire whether or not that is their 
preference.42 Finally, even if the courts do retreat in their pursuit 
of fairness here, they have indicated a willingness to carry the 
quest elsewhere. 
By taking "over from political institutions the pragmatic, nee-
40. Karcher v. Daggett. 103 S.Ct. 2653 (1983). See id. at 2667 (Stevens. J .. concur-
ring): !d. at 2689 (Powell. J .. dissenting). 
41 458 U.S. 613 (1982). 
42. Cf. Berns. Voting Rights and Wrongs. Commentary. Mar. 1982. at 31 
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essarily unprincipled management"43 of apportionment, the courts 
have obviated any semblance of accommodation. And as Justice 
Stewart argues, redistricting is essentially accommodation: 
Representative government is a process of accommodating group interests 
through democratic institutional arrangements. . . . Appropriate legislative ap-
portionment, therefore. should ideally be designed to insure effective representa-
tion . . . . [T]his ideal is approximated in the particular apportionment system of 
any State by a realistic accommodation of the diverse and often conflicting polit-
ical forces operating within the State.44 
That is, the courts err in imposing their standards on national, 
state, and municipal legislative bodies when it is politics that is 
being debated. Of course there are winners and losers in appor-
tionment, because the "very essence of districting is to produce a 
different-a more 'politically fair'-result than would be reached 
with elections at large."4s And thus, the courts are wrong in 
thinking that there is a correct, fair apportionment for every legis-
lature in America, because "[e]quality of representation is one 
goal among many, to be accommodated to others."46 
The solution the courts have imposed ignores our Madis-
onian political tradition. Most Americans identify with one or 
more groups, and those groups, representing varying constituen-
cies, compete with each other for advantage. One consequence of 
Madisonian politics is an inherent tension in the scheme of repre-
sentation. It calls for majoritarian government, which requires 
that most of the time most of the people will rule. But it also calls 
for reflective representation, which means that the institutions will 
"reflect the people in all their diversity, so that all the people may 
feel that their particular interests and even prejudices . . . were 
brought to bear on the decision-making process."47 That is why 
the state and national executives represent different constituencies 
than the legislatures. And federalism further compounds the vari-
ety of interests reflected. Ours is a reflective democracy in which 
groups, as well as individuals, are represented. 
B. PATRONAGE 
The push for a fair politics has not been limited to reappor-
tionment. Twice in the past decade the Supreme Court has chal-
lenged aspects of the time-honored patronage system. In Elrod v. 
43. Bickel. The Grear Apportionment Case, NEw REPUBLIC. Apr. 9. 1962. 13. 14. 
44. Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 749 (1964) (Stewart. J.. 
dissenting). 
45. 412 U.S. at 753. 
46. Bickel, supra note 43, at 13. 
47. Bickel. supra note 12. at 488. 
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Burns4s Justice Brennan, speaking for a plurality, prohibited the 
sheriff of Cook County, Illinois from firing non-civil-service, non-
policy-making employees. The firings unconstitutionally re-
strained their freedom of belief and right to associate and affiliate 
with a political party. True, Brennan conceded, speech can be 
limited if the action furthers some vital government interest, is the 
least restrictive way of doing so, and provides benefits that out-
weigh the loss of first amendment rights. Political firing by a 
newly elected sheriff satisfies none of those requirements: there 
are better ways to obtain effective and efficient government; polit-
ical loyalty is not relevant to the jobs of non-policymaking em-
ployees; weakening patronage politics will not destroy political 
parties and might reinvigorate political democracy. 
The Court followed Brennan's precedent and clarified his test 
in Branti v. Finke/,49 which involved the firing of two assistant 
public defenders because they were Republicans. Sometimes 
party membership is important, Justice Stevens acknowledged, as 
in the appointment of election judges; other times it is insignifi-
cant despite a high degree of confidentiality, as in hiring a football 
coach. But the burden always is on the hiring authority to show 
that politics is an appropriate requirement for effective perform-
ance. Because the public defender is responsible to the citizenry 
and shares no confidentiality regarding policymaking, it is consti-
tutionally impermissible to fire him for political reasons. 
Two lower court cases are relevant here. Illinois State Em-
ployees Union v. Lewisso is an early case where the Seventh Cir-
cuit developed an argument similar to that of Burns and Branti. 
The lengthy opinion was written by then Judge Stevens. Shakman 
v. Democratic Organization of Cook Countys' is also germane be-
cause it advances what might be the logical extension of the polit-
ical firing cases: the unconstitutionality of a state's entire 
patronage system. District Judge Bua declared that patronage 
politics provides "a substantial electoral advantage for regular 
Democratic Party candidates, with a corresponding disadvantage 
to opposing candidates and voters,"s2 from which one can con-
clude that politics as practiced in Cook County is unfair. 
Indeed, the pith of each of these decisions is the conviction 
that politics is unfair when incumbency weighs so heavily. The 
same conviction was frequently used to justify court-ordered reap-
48. 427 u.s. 347 (1976). 
49. 445 u.s. 507 (1980). 
50. 473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1972). 
51. 481 F. Supp. 1315 (W.D. Ill. E.D. 1979). 
52. /d. at 1321. 
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portionment, on the theory that incumbent state legislators were 
unlikely to vote themselves out of jobs. In the same sense, Justice 
Brennan states, political firing "tips the electoral process in favor 
of the incumbent party,"s3 which might enable those incumbents 
to "starve political opposition."s4 If allowed to remain unencum-
bered, "[p]atronage can result in the entrenchment of one or a few 
parties."ss And even if the worst case does not come to be, pa-
tronage undoubtedly can retard the process of political 
democracy.s6 
Brennan sounds moderate compared to Judge Bua, who 
reads Reynolds and other reapportionment cases to prescribe 
equal participation in the political process. If patronage creates 
any significant advantage, he concludes, that is sufficient proof 
that it is unfair. And thus, it is enough that the patronage system 
deliberately favors some candidates over others. Judge Bua does 
not stop there, but continues with a conspiracy theory: 
[T]he non-consenting defendants have independently infringed the plaintiffs' con-
stitutional rights through their use of patronage hiring. firing. and promotion 
practices. as well as through their conspiracy with the consenting defendants to 
practice and funher patronage hiring practices57 
In declaring patronage unconstitutional, the courts err in two 
ways. First, they focus on individual actions taken out of context. 
As Powell maintains, the Court underestimates the strength of 
government interests and exaggerates the burdens suffered by the 
fired workers.ss Displaying so little appreciation for the long-
range nature of politics, the judges appoint themselves as the 
guardians of fair play. Concurring in 1//inois State Employees v. 
Lewis,s9 Judge Campbell foresees the courts becoming "super 
civil service commissions" as they struggle to cope with a possible 
1,946 additional trials. In New York and Illinois, state legislatures 
already had responded to the evils of patronage politics by opting 
for a fifty-fifty blend of civil service and spoils appointments.6o In 
other words, the ongoing dialogue did speak to failings within the 
political system; the problem, of course, is that it was not a re-
sponse approved by the guardian judges. 
53. 427 U.S. at 356. 
54. /d. 
55. /d. at 369. 
56. /d. 
57. 481 F. Supp. at 1349 (emphasis added). 
58. 427 U.S. at 382 (Powell. J., dissenting). 
59. 473 F.2d at 578. 
60. 427 U.S. at 375 (Burger, C.J., dissenting): 445 U.S. 508, 521 (1980) (Powell. J.. 
dissenting). 
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Second, the courts' reasoning is fallacious. Incumbents may 
have an unfair advantage and politics may be unfair, but it does 
not follow that therefore patronage is unconstitutional. Gerry-
mandering is patently unfair, as are the advantages that incum-
bent congressmen have because they are more visible, have 
franking privileges, and can claim expertise. Sure, it was unfair to 
fire Burns and Finkel, but the way they were hired originally was 
also unfair. To call these actions unconstitutional simply because 
they seem unfair is to evidence considerable naivete about the re-
alities of a healthy political democracy. Is it possible to attain the 
"unfettered judgment of each citizen"?6t And how can one equal-
ize influence? Some are better thinkers; some have more money; 
some care more intensely; some are lucky. To suggest that all 
influence can be removed~r should be removed-is to propose a 
dream world devoid of politics. 
The degree to which the courts misunderstand democratic 
politics is manifest in their choice of precedents. The pertinent 
cases, they declare, are those where communists and socialists 
have been fired from teaching in the public schools for advocating 
subversive ideas. But the suppression of ideas expounded by com-
munists and socialists is not apposite to the use of hiring and firing 
to make politics work more effectively. Patronage is a "practice as 
old as the Republic, a practice which has contributed significantly 
to the democratization of American politics."62 Rather than sup-
pressing beliefs, it opened the system for much of the populace 
originally and for the waves of immigrants later. 
Furthermore, the two beliefs are different in kind. Commu-
nists advocate an ideological position that needs first amendment 
protection because it challenges the predominant views of most 
Americans. Political parties, to the contrary, avoid ideology in 
favor of broad-based policies that will further their primary goal 
of winning elections. Rather than reflecting ideological beliefs, 
political parties generate interest in politics and help organize gov-
ernment. To fire someone because of his political beliefs, from a 
job that he originally obtained because of his political beliefs, 
hardly denies the right to advo<;ate a policy position. What it does 
reflect is the political position favored by a majority of the popu-
lace. When you fire a communist because you do not want him to 
express his views, he may be shut off permanently; when yo.u fire a 
political appointee it is because the folks back home dec1ded to 
kick his boss temporarily out of office. Patronage advances demo-
61. 427 U.S. at 372. 
62. /d. at 376 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
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cratic politics; unlike firing of teachers with dissident views, pa-
tronage does not threaten the existence of an open society. 
Here, as in the reapportionment cases, the courts assume that 
there is a single standard of fairness. Instead of letting the polit-
ical system accommodate competing notions of representation, the 
courts impose their own definition of accountable representation. 
Hence, Justice Brennan's evaluation of the stat..: imaest in effec-
tive government assays the efficiency of public employees and 
concludes that requirements such as merit are the best way to as-
sure accountability.63 But that ignores a different kind of account-
ability, that of the nonexpert whose loyalty is to the policies of 
those elected and who advocates that loyalty in many ways. To 
think that a midlevel clerk in a voter registration office only 
processes forms is sheer folly. That clerk works diligently to keep 
politics alive between elections; he is a representative of the in-
party and those who contact him for information or favors know 
it; he serves the party loyally even when not privy to confidential 
policy; he probably entered politics not because of "some aca-
demic interest in 'democracy,' "64 but for other reasons, including 
the prospect of a good job. Only Justice Powell, it seems, grasps 
that accountability and effectiveness work in many ways: 
Voters can and do hold parties to long-term accountability, and it is not too much 
to say that, in their absence, responsive and responsible performance in low-pro-
file offices, particularly, is difficult to maintain65 
Only Powell seems to be aware that "the theoretical abstractions 
of a political science seminar" do not always apply to the real 
world of politics.66 
In his dissenting opinions Powell extols the virtues of a lively, 
vigorous politics, in which patronage is especially valuable be-
cause it enhances party loyalty. And political parties, he asserts, 
advance a "variety of substantial governmental interests"67; they 
help connect executives and legislatures; they help clarify the 
choices in an election; they constrain political fragmentation in a 
society; they keep interest alive in local elections; they "supply an 
essential coherence and flexibility to the American political 
scene."6s 
63. Jd. at 366-68. 
64. /d. at 385 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
65. /d. 
66. Jd. at 382. 
67. 445 U.S. at 528 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
68. Jd. at 532. 
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C. STATE REGULATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES 
Wisconsin law establishes an open primary whereby any reg-
istered voter can participate in either primary. After the primary, 
delegates to the national convention are chosen by a process that 
does require open affiliation with the party, but those delegates 
are committed by Wisconsin law to follow the results of the pri-
mary election at the national party convention. Because that is 
contrary to procedures established by the National Democratic 
Party, a controversy arose in 1980 as to whether the Wisconsin 
delegation should be seated. 
In Democratic Party v. LaFol/ette,69 the Supreme Court de-
cided in favor of the Democratic Party on the basis of the right to 
associate freely and to "define their associational rights by limit-
ing those who could participate in the processes."?o Following 
earlier decisions in party convention and election ballot cases, the 
Court declared that political parties have a right to protect them-
selves from intrusion by external forces. The compelling interests 
advanced by the state were rejected because those interests are 
limited to the primary and not to the separate voting for delegate 
selection. As Stewart seems to imply, in cases such as this one 
there really is not much the Court can do. To enter the fray would 
be to "substitute its own judgement for that of the Party,"7 1 so 
neither the Supreme Court nor Wisconsin can order the national 
Democratic Party to seat delegates chosen in violation of its rules. 
And besides, Stewart suggests this way everyone should be happy: 
the state's interest in elections and the party's interest in delegate 
selection can coexist harmoniously. 
At first glimpse it seems as if the Court finally has come to 
understand politics. And yet Powell, the previous defender of 
politics, dissents. The reason, I believe, is that again only he per-
ceives the breadth and subtlety of politics. The majority incor-
rectly equates politics with political parties. To the contrary, 
political parties are only one actor in the broader conversation of 
politics, and they represent only one interest in the ensuing ac-
commodation. Both the national Democratic party and the state 
of Wisconsin are committed to opening the political process. If 
the open primary skews the delegates one way, the party reforms 
skew them a second way. The point is, there is no "right" way to 
guarantee an open political process. The colloquy between the 
69. 450 u.s. 107 (1981). 
70. /d. at 122. 
71. /d. at 124. 
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political parties and state election laws is proof that the process is 
open: 
The history of state regulation of the major political panies suggests a contin-
uing accommodation of the interests of the panies with those of the States and 
their citizens. . . . Today, the Coun departs from this process of accommoda-
tion. It does so, it seems to me, by upholding a First Amendment claim by one of 
the two major panies without any serious inquiry into the extent of the burden on 
associational freedoms and without due consideration of the countervailing state 
interests. 72 
Accommodation of that sort is best left to the ongoing political 
conversation. 
III. DEFINING THE JUDICIAL ROLE 
What then should be the role of the courts in the political 
system? To begin with they must remember that they are one ac-
tor in the ongoing dialogue, that their decisions are not law final-
ized, but merely the "beginnings of conversations between the 
Court and the people and their representatives."73 They also 
would do well to rely frequently on the passive virtues. Vague-
ness, delegation, ripeness, political questions-all "techniques of 
'not doing,' devices for disposing of a case while avoiding judg-
ment on the constitutional issues it raises"74--enable the court to 
observe and enhance the political process. Sometimes it is better 
for democracy to allow the representative branches, rather than 
the counter-majoritarian one, to make decisions. Sometimes the 
decision depends on expediency instead of principle, and the court 
has no business participating. Sometimes the accommodation 
makes more sense when additional actors are encouraged to par-
ticipate. But always these passive virtues strengthen the colloquy, 
so that when a decision finally is made, it encompasses different 
paths, "lesser doctrines,'' and a series of "partial answers,'' so that 
the final doctrine is one "to which widespread acceptance may 
fairly be attributed."1s 
And yet, the courts are more than just another political actor. 
There is a proper mystique about the courts that grows out of their 
special interest in protecting the fundamental principles of the na-
tion. The courts can encourage politics to be more than just a 
contest of wills, but only if they sometimes are willing to overrule 
the political accommodation. 
72. /d. at 137 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
73. A. BICKEL, supra note 20, at 91. 
74. A. BICKEL, supra note 16, at 169. 
75. /d. at 246. 
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The problem, which has been the cause for considerable de-
bate, is to identify those times. If politics is as important as I have 
argued, the standard the Court might employ is to intervene only 
when it becomes evident that politics no longer is working. If 
politics is excluding groups or individuals (denying the right to 
vote because of race) or if the continued existence of politics is 
threatened (speech that creates a clear and present danger) or if 
the political system refuses to rectify fundamental wrongs (segre-
gated schools in a nation founded on the principle of equality), 
then the Court should enter the fray by invoking those principles 
that "rest on fundamental presuppositions rooted in history."76 
Commentators suggest two reasons why that standard is too 
limited. According to one argument, representation, not tradi-
tional values, is the essence of popular government and the key to 
protecting minorities. Because the Constitution is a "process of 
government, not a governing ideology,"n there should be absolute 
standards that guarantee the integrity of representation. The 
court should interfere whenever the ins choke off opportunity for 
change by limiting the outs, or whenever an "effective majority" 
systematically disadvantages a minority out of "simple hostil-
ity."7s It is not enough to protect the basic right to vote; the courts 
also must see that the vote is not diluted or lessened through ex-
cessive delegation. 
A second contention is that politics is working only when the 
Constitution's substantive rights are protected and enhanced, 
which presupposes that the Constitution has a moral character. 
Furthermore, the ensuing process cannot be regarded as neutral. 
Behind every procedural question-from voting to reapportion-
ment-there always is a "substantive vision of proper conduct."79 
Rather than hiding behind procedural questions, the Court is obli-
gated to defend the substantive Constitution.so 
That, of course, leads us back to the initial problem: courts 
imposing their understanding of fair and equal representation 
upon the political system. And the dilemma remains. When is the 
Court justified in casting aside its role of equal conversant in the 
colloquy and becoming a guardian by overruling the political ac-
commodation? There is no easy answer, but courts could do well 
76. /d. at 238. 
77. J. ELY, supra note 13, at 101. 
78. /d. at 103. 
79. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE 
L.J. 1063, 1076 (1980). 
80. See, e.g., Saphire, The Search for Legitimacy in Constitutional Theory: What Price 
Purity? 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 335 (1981). 
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to take a lesson from Aristotle, sharpen their practical wisdom, 
and set their sights on a mean that accommodates process and 
rights. I have in mind something like Justice Stevens's opinion in 
Mobile v. Bolden .st It is especially instructive when placed appo-
site Stewart's majority opinion, which defers to the political pro-
cess, and Marshall's dissent, which propounds an absolute 
constitutional standard. 
Marshall perceives a neat hierarchy of rights and demands 
absolute fairness. His starting point is the dogma of Reynolds: 
"the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and demo-
cratic society,"sz equally fundamental whether the vote is denied 
or diluted, because they are "analytically the same concept."83 In-
deed, the "fundamental right to equal electoral participation . . . 
encompasses protection against vote dilution."s4 Any discrimina-
tory effect debases the vote: "[t]he theoretical foundations ... are 
shattered where, as in the present case, the right to vote is granted 
in form, but denied in substance."ss Because those rights exist in-
dependently of the historical process, they are fundamental and 
must take precedence over all else. 
By carrying the principles first declared in Reynolds to their 
logical conclusion, Marshall exposes the flaws in establishing an 
absolute "fairness" standard. First, there is the irony that the 
Court's defense of individual rights results in abnegating the right 
of an entire city to choose a form of government. It also is ironic 
that what began as a defense of individual rights has become a 
call for proportional representation of groups.s6 But the greatest 
irony-and it is a disheartening one-is Marshall's threat that un-
less the government of Mobile, Alabama behaves, it "cannot ex-
pect the victims of discrimination to respect political channels of 
seeking redress."s7 
The cornerstone of Stewart's opinion is that although every-
one has the right to participate, no one has the right to any partic-
ular outcome. Showing considerable deference to the existing 
process, Stewart focuses on whether Mobile's commission govern-
ment is "motivated by a discriminatory purpose."ss He does so 
81. 446 U.S. 55, 83 (1980). See the discussion of judicial statesmanship in G. JAcos-
soHN, PRAG!\.IATISM. ST,.\TESMANSHIP, AND THE SUPREME COURT (1977). 
82. 446 U.S. at 115 (Marshall, J.. dissenting). 
83. /d. at I 16 (Marshall. J., dissenting). 
84. /d. at 114. 
85. /d. at 141. 
86. To be fair, Marshall does reject the charge that he is calling for proportional 
representation. 
87. 446 U.S. at 141 (Marshall. 1.. dissenting). 
88. /d. at 62. 
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because if there are no "official obstacles" and if all persons can 
"register and vote in Mobile 'without hindrance,' " there is no 
constitutional violation.s9 He considers the question of motiva-
tion from different perspectives, and each time the conclusion is 
the same: if there is no purposeful discrimination, there is no con-
stitutional wrongdoing. Even a history of past discrimination now 
discontinued cannot "condemn governmental action that is not it-
self unlawful."9o 
Stewart resists playing the role of guardian because, true to 
the political system, he envisions a world of many groups: Blacks, 
whites, Republicans, Democrats, union workers, university per-
sonnel-the list is endless. Even to attempt to assure an abso-
lutely fair chance to each would "spawn endless litigation."9I In 
reminding the dissenters that no group has the right to be pro-
tected from electoral defeat, Stewart upholds the validity of the 
process whereby everyone has an equal right to vote and partici-
pate and groups compete for control. Winners cannot be foreor-
dained but will emerge from that process. 
The theory makes sense, but anybody who has lived in the 
Deep South might question whether it is true to the facts. The at-
large commission form of government in Mobile does lessen the 
probability of effective participation by black citizens. And even 
if all of the physical obstacles have been removed, there is a long 
history of discrimination in Mobile, Alabama. To be sure, Stew-
art's ultimate conclusion is correct, but he gets there too easily. 
Stevens avoids the sure answers of Marshall and Stewart and 
seeks an accommodation of their opinions. He sets the stage with 
a distinction between state action that inhibits the right to vote 
and the issue in Mobile-state action that affects the political 
groups competing for leadership. This issue has two, interrelated 
dimensions. It involves both rights-fourteenth and fifteenth 
amendments in Mobile-and process, and the rights must be 
judged by a "standard that allows the political process to function 
effectively."92 That is, the process must be kept alive, but there 
are substantive rights that have to be protected. 
89. Id. at 65, 71-73. 
90. Id. at 74. 
91. /d. at 80. 
92. Jd. at 85 {Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). Stevens develops the argu-
ment more fully in Rogers v. Lodge and Karcher v. Dagget. In the former he focuses on 
why black voters as a group cannot be singled out for protection, unless there is clear racial 
gerrymandering. In the latter he develops his theory of gerrymandering. Whether these 
are acceptable, logical extensions of the argument in Mobile ts a separate quest10n. 
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Gomillion v. Lighifoot ,93 Stevens believes, suggests a way the 
two dimensions can coexist. In that case the Court overruled the 
political process because a gerrymander that excluded blacks 
(1) was "not the product of a routine or traditional political deci-
sion," (2) "had a significant adverse impact on a minority group," 
and (3) "was unsupported by any neutral justification."94 By fo-
cusing on the "objective effects of the political decision,"9s Stevens 
is satisfied that all groups are being treated the same and that 
none is being excluded unfairly. His test also takes into account 
that for the legislative process of apportionment to work, "it must 
reflect an awareness of group interests and it must tolerate some 
attempts to advantage or disadvantage particular segments of the 
voting populace."96 Hence, the process is protected, but so too are 
the rights of groups within the process. 
It may not matter to the black citizens of Mobile, but this is a 
more intellectually satisfying explanation than Stewart's. I do not 
suggest it is the last word, but merely that it is an important opin-
ion because it shows a sensitivity to politics that is rare on the 
Court. It conveys the crucial idea that politics involves both a 
process and fundamental rights. Most of the time these two 
dimensions keep each other in check with the support of all the 
actors engaged in the conversation. Occasionally, politics will 
lean too far one way or the other and threaten its own survival. 
Only then should the Court become more than just another ac-
tor-and then only for long enough to nudge politics back to a 
healthy mean between process and rights. 
93. 364 U.S. 339 ( 1960). 
94. 446 U.S. at 90 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
95. /d. at 90. 
96. /d. at 91. 
